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1. Marc Ladreit de
Lacharrière, a French
businessman, controls 79
percent of Fimalac’s shares
and 87 percent of voting
rights. The Hearst
Corporation, a media
conglomerate, is owned by
a trust administered by 13
Trustees, including five
representatives of the
Hearst family.
2. Of this list, all except
Dagong are registered with
the US Securities and
Exchange Commission
(SEC), which designates
them as Nationally
Recognized Statistical
Rating Organizations
(NRSROs). A 2009
application for registration
by Dagong was not
accepted by the SEC (SEC,
2011a, p4). At the time of
writing, most prominent
CRAs are not yet registered
with the European
Securities and Markets
Authority (ESMA).
3. Source: annual report of
Fimalac (2009-10).
4. Includes all the ‘other’
CRAs listed in the main text
except for Dagong.
However, their volumes of activity are dwarfed by
those of the ‘big three’, as Table 1 suggests.
CRAs rate different types of issuers or issuances.
For example, Fitch reports that in 2009-10 it rated
around 6,000 financial institutions, 2,000 non-
financial corporates, 100 sovereign states and
200 territorial communities, 300 infrastructure
bond issuances, 46,000 US municipal bond
issuances, and 8,500 structured product
issuances3. A simplistic but common way of seg-
menting the market is between sovereign ratings,
corporate ratings, and structured credit ratings. 
THE PROBLEMS WITH CRAS
This section summarises the most often men-
tioned problems linked to CRA activity, and
assesses their materiality. 
1 CRAs are unreliable
Measuring the accuracy of credit ratings is intrin-
sically difficult, even with hindsight, because they
correspond to probabilities. A poorly-rated issuer
may avoid a default even though the probability of
default was high; conversely, a highly-rated issuer
may default even though the probability of it was
low. Thus, strictly speaking ratings quality can
only be measured on average over many rating
CREDIT RATING AGENCIES (CRAs) are prominent
participants in the assessment of credit risk by
financial markets. They determine and publish
credit ratings, which represent the CRAs’ opinions
on issuers’ relative probability of default. The
market for credit ratings is currently dominated in
most western countries by three players:
• Standard & Poor’s (S&P) is a division of the
McGraw-Hill Companies, a US-based media
group whose ownership is dispersed (the
largest shareholder is Capital Group, with 12
percent of shares); 
• Moody’s Corporation is an autonomous US-
based listed company with dispersed owner-
ship (the largest shareholder is Berkshire
Hathaway, with 12.5 percent of shares); 
• Fitch Ratings, a division of the Fitch Group
which is jointly owned by Fimalac, a Paris-
based listed investment vehicle (60 percent of
shares), and the US-based Hearst Corporation
(40 percent of shares)1.
Other notable rating agencies include AM Best
(US-based, specialised in the insurance industry);
Egan Jones (US); Kroll Bond Rating Agency (US);
the ratings unit of Morningstar (US); Dominion
Bond Rating Service (Canada); Japan Credit
Rating Agency (Japan); Rating & Investment
Information (Japan); and Dagong Global (China)2.
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Table 1: Dominance of the ‘big three’ CRAs
S&P Moody's Fitch Others4
Revenue (US$m) 1,696 2,032 657 n.a.
Share of ‘big three’ total 39% 46% 15%
Operating earnings (US$m) 762 773 200 35
Share of total 43% 44% 11% 2%
Outstanding credit ratings 1,190,500 1,039,187 505,024 81,888
Share of total 42% 37% 18% 3%
Credit analysts and supervisors 1,345 1,204 1,049 392
Share of total 34% 30% 26% 10%
Source: annual reports and SEC (2011a and 2011b), author’s calculations.
opinions, based on the law of large numbers, and
not on individual ratings. Moreover, according to
the CRAs, their ratings measure relative probabil-
ities of default, not absolute ones. An AA rating sig-
nals a lower probability of default than a BBB, but
CRAs do not provide a numerical estimate of the
respective probabilities (even though they do pub-
lish historical data on the frequency of default
associated with different past ratings).
From this standpoint there was a clear failure of
CRAs when it came to US mortgage-based
structured products in the mid-2000s. Many
mortgage-based securities were highly rated but
had to be downgraded in large numbers following
the housing market downturn in 2006-07,
especially in the subprime segment. Subsequent
enquiries, in particular SEC (2008) and FCIC
(2011), have convincingly linked the CRAs’ failure
to a quest for market share in a rapidly growing
and highly profitable market segment. Under
commercial pressure, CRAs failed to devote
sufficient time and resources to the analysis of
individual transactions, and also neglected to
back single transaction assessments with top-
down macroeconomic analysis that could have
alerted them to the possibility of a US nationwide
property market downturn.
While the CRAs fully merit blame for this failure, it
should be noted that the provision of credit ratings
for residential mortgage-based securities in the
2000s was a relatively recent activity compared
to corporate and sovereign ratings, and that the
subprime segment was new within the larger US
mortgage market5. In other segments, including
corporate and sovereign ratings, CRAs could rely
on much longer and deeper experience of risk fac-
tors and past failure patterns. In these more ‘tra-
ditional’ segments, statistical tables published by
the CRAs and others (eg IMF, 2010, Figure 3.7)
suggest a generally strong correlation between
past ratings and relative average probabilities of
default as observed ex post over large numbers.
That said, there have been several past cases in
5. It should also be noted
that no comparable failure
has been observed in other
asset-backed securities
markets in the US, or in
Europe or Asia, whose
structured securities
markets are smaller and
more recent than those in
the US.
6. BIS Quarterly Review,
December 2010, page 11.
03
BR U EGE L
POLICY
CONTRIBUTION
‘All three main CRAs have a decent though far from spotless record in sovereign and corporate
ratings, but their hardly excusable failure over the rating of US residential mortgage-based
securities in the mid-2000s has lastingly damaged their brands and reputations.’
which rating agencies clearly failed to spot deteri-
orations of sovereign or corporate creditworthi-
ness in due time: this was particularly true of
Lehman, AIG or Washington Mutual, which kept
investment-grade credit ratings until 15 Septem-
ber 2008. CRAs were similarly criticised for their
failure to anticipate the Asian crisis of 1997-98 or
the Enron bankruptcy in late 2001.
It appears fair to conclude that all three main CRAs
have a decent though far from spotless record in
sovereign and corporate ratings, but that their
hardly excusable failure over the rating of US res-
idential mortgage-based securities in the mid-
2000s has lastingly damaged their brands and
reputations. 
2 CRA downgrades can trigger sudden shifts in
risk perceptions
Since the beginning of the crisis, CRAs have fre-
quently been accused of timing their downgrades
badly and of precipitating sudden negative shifts
in investor consensus. However, it is infrequent
that rating downgrades surprise markets – gen-
erally they follow degradations of market senti-
ment rather than precede it. When CRAs do
anticipate, they are often not given much atten-
tion by investors, such as when S&P started
downgrading Greece in 2004.
Specifically, the evolution of euro-area sovereign
yields since 2008 suggests that the biggest and
most sudden shifts in investor sentiment have
been triggered by new information from the policy
sphere – such as, among others, the announce-
ment by Greece of worse deficits than previously
disclosed, the French-German Deauville declara-
tion of 18 October 2010, or the euro-area Presi-
dent’s suggestion of a ‘re-profiling’ on 16 May
2011. These policy signals have had demonstra-
ble impacts on risk perceptions, as the Bank for
International Settlements noted in the case of the
Deauville declaration6. By comparison, CRA down-
grades of euro-area countries so far have had lim-
ited market impact, if any.
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7. See note 2.
8. The assessment of these
EU regulations is kept
outside the scope of this
Policy Contribution.
The sovereign downgrade of the US by S&P on 5
August 2011 was a special case, to the extent that
the US sovereign debt market has a specific
anchoring role for the global financial system and
there had never been a downgrade of US sovereign
debt in living memory. Ironically, it coincided with
a sharp increase in risk aversion which resulted in
a short-term decrease of yields on US debt. The
downgrade may have contributed to market jitters
about France’s creditworthiness and French
banks’ prospects in the days that followed. How-
ever, at the time of writing there does not appear
to be an analytical consensus on its role in trig-
gering these market developments compared to
other simultaneous factors.
The upshot is that instances in which CRA down-
grades materially affect general market sentiment
seem to be possible but very rare, and that none
has been compellingly observed recently in the
context of the euro-area crisis. 
3 Rating downgrades can trigger pro-cyclical
effects due to automatic contractual or
regulatory mechanisms
References to credit ratings are embedded in a
number of contractual and regulatory provisions
throughout the financial system. Thus, even
though CRAs argue that their ratings are mere
opinions intended for the judgment of market par-
ticipants, they can have a mechanical, pro-cycli-
cal effect if such provisions result in, for example,
forced selling of a security as a consequence of
its downgrade. The collateral policy of the Euro-
pean Central Bank (ECB) is one example.
However, the actual extent of such mechanical
pro-cyclical effects is limited by several factors.
Most investment mandates now have significant
built-in flexibility to reduce dependency on indi-
vidual rating changes. The ECB has displayed con-
siderable flexibility in adapting its collateral policy
to new developments, including rating down-
grades, throughout the crisis. Strikingly, as
observed above, no large pro-cyclical effect on US
debt markets has been observed following the
downgrade of the US by S&P in August 2011.
While credit ratings are affected by economic
cycles, they tend to be much more stable than
market-based indicators of creditworthiness
(Moody’s, 2009). Thus, replacing credit ratings
with market-based measures would reinforce pro-
cyclicality.
In short, mechanical pro-cyclical effects of rating
downgrades are a legitimate concern, even though
CRAs are not to blame for them. However, these
effects seem to be already mitigated to a signifi-
cant extent. 
4 CRAs escape local regulations
CRAs started life outside of the scope of public reg-
ulation, often in connection with media and/or
advisory businesses. The US introduced the
NRSRO7 process of administrative recognition of
CRAs in 1975, and a more hands-on registration
regime was introduced by the US Credit Rating
Reform Act of 2006. In the European Union, the
regulatory framework was not intrusive until the
crisis, but has evolved rapidly with the adoption
of successive regulations in September 2009
(known as CRA 1) and May 2011 (CRA 2)8; a third
regulation is at an early stage of development.
Other jurisdictions, including Japan, Australia and
Hong Kong, have also adopted a new CRA regula-
tory framework since the crisis.
As with other financial information intermediaries,
territoriality is a difficult issue in the context of
such regulations. In principle, creditworthiness
analysis of any issuer can be done from any loca-
tion. Moreover, the global consistency of credit rat-
ings is viewed by most market participants as a
significant benefit. The combination of these two
factors potentially reduces the scope and effec-
tiveness of territorial regulation.
Within the EU, this issue has been addressed with
the devolution of most regulatory and supervisory
tasks regarding CRAs to the recently created Euro-
pean Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA),
which in principle guarantees regulatory consis-
tency across all EU member states. However, the
risk remains of inconsistency or interference with
regulatory regimes in non-EU jurisdictions. 
5 The market for credit ratings is oligopolistic
The ‘big three’ CRAs account for most of the market
WHAT CAN AND CANNOT BE DONE ABOUT RATING AGENCIES? Nicolas Véron
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9. Sources: annual reports
of McGraw-Hill (2010),
Moody’s (2010), and
Fimalac (2009/10),
author’s calculations.
10. Source: annual reports
of Moody’s (2010) and
Fimalac (2009/10).
Equivalent figures were not
found for S&P.
for credit ratings in all western countries, with a
dominant market share in the hands of S&P and
Moody’s alone. The existence of high barriers to
entry is corroborated both by the incumbents’
high profit margins and by the absence of major
successful new entrants for almost a century.
Specifically, the operating profitability over the
last reported fiscal year was 45 percent for S&P,
38 percent for Moody’s and 30 percent for Fitch
Ratings, measured as ratio of operating income to
total revenue9. S&P, Moody’s and Fitch trace their
origins back to 1860, 1909 and 1913
respectively.
The high degree of market concentration need not
be a problem per se. Some markets are highly con-
centrated yet highly competitive: an oft-cited case
is the market for colas, with the global dominance
of Coca-Cola and Pepsico. Market concentration is
common in other financial information segments,
including international financial dailies (Financial
Times and Wall Street Journal) and financial
market data providers (Thomson Reuters and
Bloomberg). Market participants may not want to
handle many different rating scales or method-
ologies, in which case a substantially less con-
centrated market structure might not be
sustainable. As noted in a World Bank policy brief
on CRAs, “there may be a benefit in having a lim-
ited number of global credit rating agencies”
(Katz, Salinas & Stephanou, 2009).
Nevertheless, concerns about market structure
appear warranted. They relate less to predatory
pricing than to the possibility of a negative impact
of market concentration on the quality of ratings.
Without competitive pressure, CRAs could become
complacent, and neglect analytical rigour and the
defense of their reputation for integrity. The fail-
ures of CRAs in rating US mortgage-based securi-
ties in the 2000s, as previously mentioned, tend
to support this view, even though it is difficult to
determine whether such failures would have been
avoided had the market been less concentrated.
Perhaps less obviously, the CRA incumbents have
not caught up well with changes in financial tech-
nology. Their linear rating scales focusing on
default probability are well suited to a world where
probability distributions are normal (Gaussian),
but become insufficient as risk-transfer tech-
niques, such as the use of derivatives, enable the
creation of skewed distributions. A more compet-
itive market landscape could arguably be more
effective at fostering innovative approaches that
would successfully meet such new challenges. 
6 Leading CRAs are non-European
The three leading CRAs retain most headquarter
functions in New York, even though one of them
(Fitch) is majority-owned by a Paris-based finan-
cial group. This also reflects the dominance of the
US in the CRAs’ business: the US accounts for 54
percent of Moody’s total revenue, and 52 percent
of its global staff is located there; for Fitch Ratings,
the corresponding ratios are 42 percent and 35
percent respectively10.
This would be a problem if it resulted in a rating
bias benefitting the US or US national interests.
The existence of such a bias is questionable. First,
CRA teams tend to be highly internationalised. For
example, S&P’s head until September 2011,
Deven Sharma, was born in India, and the number
two executive at Moody’s, Michel Madelain, is
French. Second, there has been no compelling evi-
dence so far that the CRAs’ corporate culture and
management practices result in the promotion of
US interests to the detriment of ratings quality.
Most recently, the downgrade of the US sovereign
credit rating by S&P, which was aggressively crit-
icised by the US government (on 7 August, Treas-
ury Secretary Timothy Geithner said S&P had
“shown really terrible judgment and they’ve han-
dled themselves very poorly”), has added cre-
dence to the view that CRA judgments are not
materially affected by territorial bias.
‘Market structure concerns, in particular the possible negative impact of market concentration
on the quality of ratings, appear warranted. Without competitive pressure, CRAs could become
complacent, and neglect analytical rigour and the defense of their reputation for integrity.’
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11. In June 2011, the con-
sulting firm Roland Berger
announced it was in prelim-
inary talks with Frankfurt-
based partners and the
state of Hesse about estab-
lishing a new ratings
agency in Frankfurt.
12. MarketWatch, ‘Treasury:
Government shouldn’t be
involved in credit ratings’, 5
August 2009
POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
This section reviews and briefly evaluates possi-
ble policy initiatives, most of them referred to in
recent public debates. 
1 Forbid ratings
Suppressing ratings activity, either on a perma-
nent or a temporary basis (eg in turbulent market
conditions, or for countries receiving support from
the International Monetary Fund or other
sources), would represent a significant constraint
on the freedom of speech and opinion that cannot
be envisaged lightly. Given what is known of the
impact of credit ratings, there does not appear to
be a public-interest motive that would justify such
a radical measure. 
2 New CRAs
As outlined in the previous section, more compe-
tition in the ratings market is desirable. On this
basis, there have been calls for the EU to take the
initiative and publicly sponsor the creation of a
European CRA that would compete with the estab-
lished ‘big three’. In a recent resolution, the Euro-
pean Parliament asked the European Commission
to study the creation of a new European Credit
Rating Foundation (European Parliament, 2011).
However, it is not evident that the current condi-
tions that frame this market, including the regu-
latory framework, would allow a lower degree of
concentration to be reached and sustained on an
ongoing basis. Attempts by new ventures to enter
the market can be welcomed, but their eventual
success cannot be taken for granted11.
A new publicly-sponsored CRA may find it difficult
to establish credibility among financial market
participants, especially in the sovereign ratings
segment as there would inevitably be a suspicion
that its ratings may be tainted by political consid-
erations. It appears reasonable to anticipate that,
in order to be a credible alternative to the incum-
bents, any new entrant will need to be able to pres-
ent itself as essentially independent from specific
political interests, and to convince market partic-
ipants that its ‘nationality’ (however defined) is
irrelevant to its ratings decisions. 
3 Public standardisation of ratings methodologies
The methodologies and criteria used by CRAs to
prepare ratings have a significant impact on rat-
ings outcomes, and are inevitably open to debate.
For example, S&P has been criticised for having
included an analysis of political dynamics in its
recent downgrade of US creditworthiness. How-
ever, the temptation to publicly regulate ratings
methodologies should be resisted, as it would col-
lide with the justification of ratings as independ-
ent opinions. In the absence of a global level of
public standardisation, such an approach would
also threaten the international comparability of
ratings.
Thus, the EU and US have been right to commit
themselves to refraining from the direct regulation
of CRA methodologies so far. A US Treasury official
declared in the Dodd-Frank legislative debate that
“the government should not be in the business of
regulating or evaluating the [CRAs’] methodolo-
gies themselves”12. The EU’s second regulation on
rating agencies (11 May 2011) specifies: “In car-
rying out their duties under this Regulation, ESMA,
the [European] Commission or any public author-
ities of a Member State shall not interfere with the
content of credit ratings or methodologies” (Article
23).
4 Changes in the CRAs’ business model
During their first decades of activities, CRAs
mostly relied on investors as their main
customers, but shifted to their current ‘issuer-
pays’ business model during the 1970s as their
activity expanded significantly. This raises the
possibility of a conflict of interest, because an
issuer might leverage the commercial relationship
to obtain a higher rating. A different business
model could be imposed as a condition for public
registration.
Whether this measure would be beneficial,
however, is questionable. The most likely outcome
would be a significant decrease in the overall
resources of regulated CRAs, as investors have
until now seemed unwilling to pay significant
amounts for credit ratings. One US-based CRA,
Egan-Jones, is financed by investors but its size
remains limited: it has five credit analysts and a
WHAT CAN AND CANNOT BE DONE ABOUT RATING AGENCIES? Nicolas Véron
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13. Source: Egan-Jones Rat-
ings Co.’s application for
registration as a NRSRO, 28
March 2011, available at
http://www.egan-
jones.com/_/docs/NRSRO/F
orm_NRSRO_March_2011.pdf
14. S&P has been the sub-
ject of a probe by the Euro-
pean Commission’s
Directorate-General for Com-
petition over fees it charged
for the distribution of Inter-
national Securities Identifi-
cation Numbers, which it
agreed to cut in May 2011.
However, this relates to
S&P’s non-rating activities.
15. The US Dodd-Frank Act
of 2010 makes CRAs liable
for “a knowing or reckless
failure to conduct a reason-
able investigation of the
facts or to obtain analysis
from an independent
source”.
16. See for example Euro-
pean Commission (2011),
end of page 4.
17. See for example Sharma
(2011).
18. On the private-sector
side see for example
EFAMA, ESF and IMA
(2008).
total staff of 22, or 200 times fewer than
Moody’s13. Moreover, an ‘investor-pays’ model
would by no means eliminate conflicts of interest,
as (for example) investors who hold a security
may desire it to be highly rated. Finally, it is to be
noted that while conflicts of interest have been a
significant issue in structured ratings, and to an
arguably lesser extent in corporate ratings, they
are essentially absent from the sovereign ratings
market from which major CRAs derive a very small
fraction of their revenue. 
5 Tighter regulation and supervision
The two successive EU regulations adopted in
2009 and 2011 resulted in significant regulatory
and supervisory powers for ESMA. Unfortunately,
there is no reason to believe such regulation will be
enough to eliminate imperfections in the credit rat-
ings market. Obviously, regulation of CRAs by the
SEC (in place since 1975 and reinforced by the
Credit Rating Reform Act of 2006) did not prevent
the subprime debacle. Europe’s regulatory screws
on CRAs are already quite tight, and full imple-
mentation of the existing regulations would be war-
ranted before envisaging their further tightening.
Moreover, both theory and experience suggest
that regulation generally reinforces barriers to
entry in concentrated markets, and there are no
reasons to believe the market for credit ratings is
an exception. Thus, tighter regulation and/or
supervision are unlikely to address the problem of
market concentration. If anything, they could
make it more intractable. Moreover, CRA regulatory
regimes in the EU and elsewhere are highly pre-
scriptive as to how CRAs should organise them-
selves and conduct their business, which could
discourage innovation and the pursuit of new
organisational or operational practices that may
eventually lead to better ratings. 
6 Assertive application of competition policy
No past competition enquiries targeted at the
market for credit ratings have been identified in
the research for this Policy Contribution14. Nor
have reports of anti-competitive practices been
found. However, a sector enquiry could be envis-
aged to address concerns about the possible exis-
tence of such practices by incumbent CRAs. 
7 A liability regime for ratings mistakes
CRAs maintain that their ratings are independent
judgments and are protected by the freedom of
opinion. Existing regimes make CRAs legally liable
for failure to comply with regulatory requirements
or with minimum standards of due process15. In
view of their market impact, however, there have
been calls to make them liable for misjudgments
or inappropriate intent16. France has adopted leg-
islation that goes in that direction.
Such an idea may entail difficulties in terms of
freedom of speech and opinion. Moreover, its
impact in terms of ratings quality would not nec-
essarily be positive. Fear of liability could lead
CRAs to become cautious to an extent that would
distort ratings outcomes. As previously exposed,
ratings represent probabilities, and therefore the
identification of individual ratings mistakes may
prove to be inextricably difficult. 
8 Reduced regulatory reliance on ratings
As many policymakers and CRA executives
themselves17 have noted, it is desirable to
eliminate references to ratings in contracts and
regulations, in order to prevent pro-cyclicality in
the financial system. Efforts have been
undertaken in this direction, by both the private
and public sectors18. However, in some cases there
are no easy alternatives at hand. In contracts,
replacing third-party ratings with an opinion on
creditworthiness emanating from the contractual
parties themselves can create legal uncertainty.
In regulations, eliminating ratings results in
shifting the burden of creditworthiness
assessment either to regulated entities, with a
risk of poor analysis or self-serving manipulation,
or to public authorities, with the risk of making the
‘Regulation of CRAs by the Securities and Exchange Commission did not prevent the subprime
debacle. Europe’s regulatory screws on CRAs are already quite tight, and full implementation of
the existing regulations would be warranted before envisaging their further tightening.’
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19. IOSCO published an
update of this code in 2008.
20. The US Dodd-Frank Act
led to amendments to Regu-
lation FD, but without sig-
nificantly affecting CRAs’
access to non-public infor-
mation (Moody’s, 2010).
21. An example is the ESMA
Statement on disclosures
related to sovereign debt to
be included in IFRS financial
statements, European Secu-
rities and Markets Author-
ity, 28 July 2011.
assessment more vulnerable to political or
opportunistic considerations.
Efforts to reduce the reliance of contracts and reg-
ulations on ratings should be pursued. However,
some reliance on ratings is likely to remain as in
certain cases it might remain preferable to any
available alternative arrangement. In its Principles
for Reducing Reliance on CRA Ratings, the Finan-
cial Stability Board concludes cautiously that “in
certain cases, it may take a number of years for
market participants to develop enhanced risk
management capability so as to enable reduced
reliance on credit rating agencies” (FSB, 2010). 
9 A global regulatory/supervisory regime for CRAs
To the extent that credit ratings are useful, their
comparability across borders is a global public
good in the context of international financial
market integration. The risk of fragmentation due
to regulatory differences was minimal before the
crisis, as only one major jurisdiction (the US)
materially constrained the behaviour of CRAs
through regulation. Now that the EU, Japan, India,
Australia, Hong Kong and other jurisdictions have
started to regulate CRAs, however, there is an
increasingly material risk of different regulators
imposing different standards resulting in a reduc-
tion of cross-border ratings comparability.
A constructive step to address this risk would be
the adoption of global standards that would deter-
mine the content of jurisdictional regulations
applicable to CRAs with the aim of maximum har-
monisation. The International Organisation of
Securities Commissions (IOSCO) would be the log-
ical forum for the discussion and preparation of
such standards, as it has done in the past for less
hands-on regulatory approaches such as its 2004
‘code of conduct fundamentals for CRAs’ (IOSCO,
2004)19. A more radical initiative would be the
establishment of a global public (treaty-based)
authority to which individual jurisdictions would
delegate the supervision of CRAs, thus ensuring
global supervisory consistency.
This proposal may sound overly ambitious on
grounds of national sovereignty, but it is to be
noted that similar arguments were long made
against the establishment of European
supervisory authorities in the financial sector,
which were eventually superseded with the
adoption of the EU financial supervisory package
in 2010. The continued global integration of
financial markets may require unprecedented
steps of international supervisory cooperation,
and CRAs are arguably one of the categories of
regulated market participants for which such
efforts could be considered most necessary. 
10 Increased public transparency from issuers
Last, but by no means least, more could be done to
reduce the role of CRAs by better empowering
investors and the wider public to make their own
judgments on issuers’ creditworthiness. This could
be achieved through a significant increase of
public disclosure requirements on issuers, and a
corresponding reduction of CRA’s access to non-
public (privileged) information. Such an effort
would take different forms in the different seg-
ments of the credit ratings market:
• Structured credit: ideally, the assets underly-
ing structured securities should be described
in detail to investors so that the CRAs that rate
them do not rely on any privileged information.
Some steps have been taken in this direction
since the start of the crisis, but more remains
to be done.
• Corporate issuers: new regulations could pre-
vent CRAs from accessing non-public informa-
tion as they currently do with issuers, in a
manner similar to what is already in place for
equity analysis (Regulation Fair Disclosure in
the US20, and the Market Abuse Directive in the
EU). Simultaneously, issuers should be
required to disclose more standardised and
audited information about their risk factors and
financial exposures. This is especially true of
financial institutions. The EU banking stress
tests of 2010 and 2011 have illustrated the
benefits of such transparency for establishing
investor trust, and some of the disclosures
imposed on stress-tested banks in the July
2011 exercise could be made a permanent
requirement. In practice, this may be achieved
through a combination of accounting disclo-
sure requirements (IFRS and related ESMA
statements21) and prudential standards (under
the Basel Accords’ so-called Pillar Three). 
WHAT CAN AND CANNOT BE DONE ABOUT RATING AGENCIES? Nicolas Véron
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• Sovereign issuers: in this segment particularly,
better public disclosure could go a long way
towards reducing the gatekeeping role of CRAs.
Government accounts and risk disclosures are not
well standardised and can be highly unreliable as
the 2009 Greek episode has shown. A coordinated
international approach towards better standardi-
sation and more robust verification processes
would be highly desirable, including major steps
towards the generalisation of accrual accounting
by governments as has already been tried in an
increasing number of countries22.
Our constantly developing financial system needs
better risk assessment than CRAs have been
collectively able to deliver in recent times. More
comprehensive public disclosure by issuers on
their financial risks, which would not require
intermediation by CRAs, is the best chance for
new and better risk assessment methodologies
and practices to emerge23. To put it in a simplistic
but concise way, what is needed is ‘a John Moody
for the twenty-first century’24. CRAs themselves
can perhaps be somewhat improved by adequate
regulation and supervision, but public policy
initiatives that focus only on CRAs are unlikely to
adequately address the need for substantially
better financial risk assessments. If real progress
is to be made towards a better public
understanding of financial risks, it will have to
involve innovative approaches that even well-
regulated CRAs, on the basis of recent experience,
may not be the best placed to deliver. 
22. International Public
Sector Accounting Stan-
dards (IPSAS) have been
developed since 1997 by
an autonomous board
hosted by the International
Federation of Accountants
(IFAC). They have been
adopted by a limited
number of countries so far,
as well as a handful of inter-
national institutions includ-
ing the European
Commission.
23. See Véron (2009) for a
more detailed development
of this argument.
24. To the extent that John
Moody, the founder of
Moody’s, can be considered
the inventor of credit rat-
ings as we know them, and
which he started publishing
in New York in 1909.
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